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CROSSING THE RUBICON:  
THE NETHERLANDS’ STEADY MARCH 
TOWARDS INVOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
n December of 2004, administrators at a Dutch hospital announced a 
new policy that would allow pediatricians to kill severely handi-
capped newborn infants.1 In early 2005, the Royal Dutch Medical Asso-
ciation revealed that it had asked the government to propose new rules to 
facilitate the killing of “disabled children, the severely mentally retarded 
and patients in irreversible comas.”2 To foreign observers who have not 
been following developments in the Netherlands, these news stories may 
have seemed shocking. Modern, liberal democracies are supposed to pro-
tect the mentally challenged and physically handicapped, not kill them. 
For those who have been paying attention, however, these latest news 
reports merely represent the next logical step3 in the Netherlands’ quix-
otic attempt to regulate euthanasia.4 
The Netherlands became the first country in modern history to for-
mally decriminalize euthanasia, the controversial practice in which a 
physician terminates the life of a patient upon the patient’s request.5 The 
                                                                                                             
 1. Michael Horsnell, Netherlands Hospital Started to Kill Terminally Ill and Se-
verely Disabled Babies with the Consent of their Parents, TIMES LONDON, Dec. 4, 2004, 
at 13. The administrators at Groningen Academic Hospital in the Netherlands have issued 
procedural guidelines to guide physicians as they provide euthanasia to infants. Id. The 
clinical guidelines are not yet available in English. 
 2. The Dutch Ponder “Mercy Killing” Rules, CNN.com, Dec. 1, 2004, 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/HEALTH/12/01/netherlands.mercykill/index.html. 
 3. Ian Traynor, Secret Killings of Newborn Babies Traps Dutch Doctors in Moral 
Maze: Call for New Rules to End Dilemma for Medical and Legal Professions, 
GUARDIAN, Dec. 21, 2004, at 3 (“From the point of view of the Netherlands, this debate 
about newborns is a logical development,” says Professor Henk Jochemsen, a medical 
ethicist and Christian critic of euthanasia. “It’s another step in the wrong direction.”). 
 4. Euthanasia typically refers to an act of a physician that is primarily intended to 
cause, and in fact causes, the death of a patient. Euthanasia was archaically referred to as 
‘mercy killing,’ however, that term is generally avoided due to its highly pejorative con-
notation. See, e.g., Lara L. Manzione, Is There A Right to Die?: A Comparative Study of 
Three Societies (Australia, Netherlands, United States), 30 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 443, 
444–46 (2002). 
 5. The Dutch define euthanasia as “the termination of life by a doctor at the patient’s 
request, with the aim of putting an end to unbearable suffering with no prospect of im-
provement.” MINISTRY OF HEALTH, WELFARE AND SPORTS, INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT, EUTHANASIA: THE NETHERLANDS’ NEW RULES (2002), 
available at http://www.minvws.nl/en/folders/ibe/euthanasia_the_netherlands_new_rules. 
asp [hereinafter NETHERLANDS’ NEW RULES]. The generic term “euthanasia” derives from 
ancient Greek for “good death,” meaning a wholesome and honorable end of one’s exis-
I 
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Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Proce-
dures) Act6 encapsulates within a single regulatory system developments 
in Dutch medical practice and case law dating from 1984.7 Although the 
Dutch criminal code continues to prohibit the intentional killing of an-
other individual,8 a physician who performs euthanasia may invoke the 
defense of noodtoestand9 and escape criminal prosecution, provided the 
physician complies with specific statutory requirements.10 
                                                                                                             
tence. THE NEW LEXICON WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 327 
(1989). In general, the Greeks’ conception of euthanasia did not entail the benevolent 
killing of another. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS 
SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 78 (1994) [here-
inafter NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE]. Conceptually, commentators frequently distin-
guish among different kinds of euthanasia, for example, between voluntary and involun-
tary euthanasia. A summary of the terminology used to describe various forms of eutha-
nasia follows in Part II of this Note. 
 6. Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act, 
chs. 4-A, 4-B (2002) (Neth.) [hereinafter Termination of Life Act or “the Act”], available 
at http://www.nvve.nl/assets/nvve/english/euthlawenglish.pdf. See Press Release, Minis-
try of Health, Welfare, and Sports, Bill for Testing Requests for Euthanasia and Help 
With Suicide Passed by the Upper House (Apr. 10, 2001), available at http://www. 
minvws.nl/en/press/ibe/bill_for_testing_requests_for_euthanasia.asp.  
  The Upper House of the Dutch Parliament passed the Termination of Life Act on 
April 10, 2001 with forty-six votes for the Act and twenty-eight votes against. The Lower 
House had approved the Act on November 28, 2000. Id. In September 2002, the Belgium 
parliament passed a bill that legalized active euthanasia by a vote of eighty-six to fifty-
one, with ten abstentions. Belgium Legalizes Euthanasia, BBC NEWS, May 16, 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1991995.stm. Oregon has legalized euthanasia, 
and two reported Japanese court decisions have stipulated the conditions under which 
active euthanasia could be permitted in Japan. Danuta Mendelson & Timothy Stoltzfus 
Jost, A Comparative Study of the Law of Palliative Care and End-of-Life Treatment, 31 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 130, 130 n.128 (2003). 
 7. NETHERLANDS’ NEW RULES, supra note 5, at 5 (“The new Act on euthanasia does 
not change the legal status of termination of life on request or physician assisted sui-
cide.”). 
 8. Article 293 of the Dutch Penal Code states, “any person who terminates another 
person’s life at that person’s express and earnest request shall be liable to a term of im-
prisonment not exceeding twelve years or a fifth-category fine.”  Termination of Life 
Act, ch. 4-A (2002) (Neth.). Article 294 states, “any person who intentionally incites 
another to commit suicide shall, if suicide follows, be liable to a term of imprisonment 
not exceeding three years or a fourth-category fine.”  Id. ch. 4-B. 
 9. The Dutch term, “noodtoestand,” refers to “circumstances in which, faced with a 
conflict between two interests, a person sacrifices the lesser interest to serve the greater 
interest.”  Julia Belian, Comment, Deference to Doctors in Dutch Euthanasia Law, 10 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 255, 260 n.36 (1996), citing L.H.C. Hulsman et al., The Dutch 
Criminal Justice System From a Comparative Legal Perspective, in INTRODUCTION TO 
DUTCH LAW FOR FOREIGN LAWYERS, 289, 303 (D.C. Fokkema et al. eds., 1978). In the 
Netherlands, Article 40 of the Dutch Penal Code provides a general waiver of criminal 
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The Dutch government asserts that its approach to euthanasia brings 
the debate about euthanasia out into the open, protects “physicians and 
other people” who are “concerned with the limits of human suffering,” 
and promotes physician compliance with the law.11 Some Dutch physi-
cians and international observers, on the other hand, express concern and 
outright outrage.12 Not only has the Netherlands rejected centuries of 
conventional Western morality, which counsels that the intentional kill-
ing of another individual is always morally wrong,13 the new law poten-
tially opens the door to non-consensual mercy killings and state-
sanctioned murder.14 
The Dutch attempt to regulate euthanasia is significant for three rea-
sons. First, the decriminalization of euthanasia, initially by the courts and 
subsequently by Parliamentary sanction in 2002, offers researchers ac-
cess to the most complete and detailed data ever assembled regarding the 
practice of euthanasia in a modern industrialized society.15 Second, the 
                                                                                                             
liability for any individual who has committed a crime but was compelled to do so out of 
moral or psychological necessity. Jos V.M. Welie, Why Physicians? Reflections on the 
Netherlands’ New Euthanasia Law, 32 HASTING CTR. RPT. 42, 44 (2002). 
 10. The statutory requirements of due care are discussed in Part II of this Note. 
 11. NETHERLANDS’ NEW RULES, supra note 5, at 1 (“Thanks to the new Act, doctors 
and terminally ill patients know now exactly what their rights and obligations are.”). 
Paradoxically, even some opponents of the Termination of Life Act admit that the new 
law finally provides clarity to a previously confusing mix of euthanasia statutes and 
cases. See, e.g., Welie, supra note 9, at 44. 
 12. See, e.g., Karel F. Gunning, Why Not Euthanasia, COMPASSIONATE HEALTHCARE 
NETWORK, Oct. 9, 2004, available at http://www.chninternational.com/why_not_eutha 
nasia_by_karel_f.htm; Richard H. Nicholson, Death is the Remedy? Old World News, 
European Laws on Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia, 23 HASTING CTR. RPT. 9, 
9 (2002). 
 13. WESLEY J. SMITH, CULTURE OF DEATH: THE ASSAULT ON MEDICAL ETHICS IN 
AMERICA 10–19 (2000). 
 14. See, e.g., Welie, supra note 9, at 44. 
 15. Paul van der Maas et al., Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Other 
Medical Practices Involving the End-of-Life in the Netherlands, 1990–1995, 335 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1699 (1996) [hereinafter Van der Maas Report]. In response to the protests 
of pro-euthanasia citizen groups, political pressure from the Royal Dutch Medical Asso-
ciation (KNMG), and several controversial euthanasia court decisions, the government 
instituted a series of studies in order to quantify the frequency of euthanasia in the Neth-
erlands and assess physician attitudes towards euthanasia. The first nationwide study, 
known as the Remmelink Report, was commissioned in 1990 and chaired by the former 
attorney general of the Supreme Court, Professor Jan Remmelink. Additional studies 
were produced in 1995 and 2001. Although the original studies are not available in Eng-
lish, summaries of the 1995 and 2001 reports have been published by the original authors 
in The New England Journal of Medicine and the British medical publication The Lancet, 
respectively. See generally Van der Maas Report, supra.  See also Bregie D. Onwuteaka-
Philipsen et al., Euthanasia and other End-of-Life Decisions in the Netherlands in 1990, 
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arguments raised in the Netherlands parallel the arguments currently be-
ing raised in other European nations and the United States.16 Finally, the 
Termination of Life Act’s post-euthanasia reporting procedure and gen-
eral reliance on voluntary physician compliance provides a concise case 
study from which legislators and jurists may extract useful lessons of law 
and public policy.17 
According to the Dutch government’s own research, physicians inten-
tionally kill patients without those patients’ request or consent in ap-
proximately one thousand cases each year.18 Other researchers, pointing 
to the narrow definition of euthanasia used in the Netherlands and the 
government’s own admission that physicians significantly under-report 
the incidence of euthanasia, estimate that physicians intentionally end the 
life of their patients in as many as six thousand cases annually without 
consultation or consent.19 The staggeringly high incidence of non-
consensual euthanasia, as reported by the Dutch government’s own ex-
perts, suggests a systemic flaw in the government’s approach to euthana-
sia law.20 
This Note will argue that the Dutch attempt to regulate euthanasia fails, 
both conceptually and practically, to prevent non-consensual killing of 
patients. Dutch physicians and jurists appear reluctant to face the empiri-
cal evidence of widespread non-consensual or “involuntary” euthana-
sia.21 By relying on the principle of noodtoestand or necessity, the Dutch 
                                                                                                             
1995, and 2001, LANCET, June 17, 2003, available at http://image.thelancet.com/ 
extras/03art3297web.pdf [hereinafter Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report]. 
 16. CARLOS F. GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE 
NETHERLANDS 16 (1991). 
 17. For example, officials in the United Kingdom and the United States have refer-
enced the Dutch approach during their domestic deliberations regarding PAS and eutha-
nasia. See, e.g., Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003); R. v. Dir. of 
Public Prosecutions [2002] 63 B.M.L.R. 1 (U.K.); Manzione, supra note 4, at 452. 
 18. The one thousand cases of involuntary euthanasia each year represents between 
0.7–0.8 percent of all deaths in the Netherlands. See Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report, supra 
note 15, at 2. 
 19. E.g., Herbert Hendin, The Dutch Experience, 17 ISSUES L. & MED. 223, 230–32 
(2002). 
 20. Because no other state has formally legalized active euthanasia, there is little data 
available with which to measure the Netherlands’ rates of voluntary and involuntary 
euthanasia. One survey of physician attitudes regarding PAS and euthanasia suggests that 
18.3 percent of American physicians have received a request for assistance with suicide 
and 6 percent of American physicians have complied with such requests at least once. 
Diane Meier et al., A National Survey of Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in 
the United States, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1193 (1998). 
 21. For example, the authors of the 2001 report flatly state, in reference to the evi-
dence of one thousand cases of termination of life without explicit request each year, that 
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shift the focus of the legal inquiry to the physician instead of the patient 
and thereby damage the foundational principle of patient autonomy. By 
disavowing the principle of patient-autonomy in favor of the principle of 
physician beneficence, the current approach to euthanasia regulation cre-
ates a system in which there appears to be no logical reason to prohibit 
the non-consensual killing of sick or marginalized patients.22 
Part II of this Note will present a brief overview of the Netherlands’ 
healthcare and legal systems and discuss early euthanasia case law. Part 
III will critique the Termination of Life Act and the efficacy of the Act’s 
due care requirements. Part IV will review empirical data from the Neth-
erlands and other scholars’ research regarding the prevalence of euthana-
sia and other end-of-life medical decisions. Part V will critique the Neth-
erlands’ euthanasia regulatory scheme and explain how its conceptual 
approach permits and even encourages involuntary euthanasia. 
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE NETHERLANDS’ LEGAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
SYSTEMS 
A. Explanation of Terms and Phrases used in this Note 
Despite voluminous academic writings and legal discourse on the sub-
ject, there is no universally accepted definition of “euthanasia.”23 In 
common usage, the term typically refers to an act of a physician that is 
primarily intended to cause, and in fact causes, the death of a patient.24 
Significantly, the generic definition of euthanasia does not imply any-
thing regarding the physician’s motives, the patient’s physical or emo-
tional condition,25 or the imminence of death.26 Unless preceded by a 
descriptive modifier such as “voluntary” or “active,” the appearance of 
the word “euthanasia” in this Note refers to the generic definition. 
                                                                                                             
“[a]pparently it is difficult to avoid this kind of action.”  Richard Fenigsen, Dutch Eutha-
nasia: The New Government Ordered Study, 20 ISSUES L. & MED. 73, 75 n.18 (2004), 
citing Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report, supra note 15, at 4. 
 22. GOMEZ, supra note 16, at 135. 
 23. JOHN KEOWN, EUTHANASIA, ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN ARGUMENT AGAINST 
LEGALIZATION 9 (2002) [hereinafter KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY]. 
 24. E.g., NEW YORK STATE supra, note 5, at 63. 
 25. Physicians refer to the process of evaluation and subsequent classification of a 
patient’s condition, symptoms, or disease as the patient’s “diagnosis.”  The accurate as-
sessment and classification of a patient’s diagnosis allows physicians to “provide a logi-
cal basis for treatment.”  TABERS’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 492–93 (C.K. 
Thomas ed., 16th ed. 1989). 
 26. The prediction of the progression of a patient’s disease or condition, including the 
estimated chance of recovery or eventual likelihood of death, is referred to as the pa-
tient’s “prognosis.”  Id. at 1492. 
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One conceptual dichotomy that has arisen is the distinction between 
“active” and “passive” euthanasia. “Active” euthanasia refers to situa-
tions in which a physician performs an affirmative act, such as injecting 
a lethal dosage of opiates into the patient, with the intent of causing the 
patient’s death.27 In contrast, “passive” euthanasia refers to the physi-
cian’s inaction or omissions, such as withholding life-sustaining hydra-
tion and nutrients or refusing to initiate potentially life-sustaining thera-
pies.28 
                                                                                                             
 27. JOHN KEOWN, EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES 99–100 (John Keown ed., 1995) [hereinafter KEOWN, PERSPECTIVES]. 
 28. Many Western societies have implicitly accepted the legality of, or more accu-
rately, have refused to recognize the illegality of, passive euthanasia, although legislators 
and physicians scrupulously avoid using the technical term. Only the Netherlands, Bel-
gium, and the state of Oregon have legalized active euthanasia, although recent court 
rulings in Japan hint that active euthanasia could be permitted in certain circumstances. 
Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 130 n.121. 
  On the other hand, passive euthanasia in the form of physicians withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment from competent, adult patients is permitted in the United Kingdom, 
Australia, Canada, Poland, Germany, France, Japan, and the United States. The Supreme 
Court of the United States and the United Kingdom’s House of Lords have expressly 
authorized physicians to withdraw life sustaining care for the purpose of hastening death. 
Id. at 133. 
  In Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, the United States Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a Missouri law that required “clear and convincing proof” of an in-
competent patient’s wishes regarding euthanasia before a court could authorize the re-
moval of life-sustaining nutrition and hydration therapy. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990). While upholding Missouri’s “clear and convincing” 
standard of proof requirement, the Supreme Court appeared to uphold the earlier holding 
of the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Quinlan that a court may authorize, in appro-
priate cases, the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical care. Id.; In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 
647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).  In Washington 
v. Glucksberg, the Court later affirmed that patients have a constitutionally protected 
right to refuse lifesaving hydration. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 
(1997). Currently, virtually every U.S. state and the District of Columbia recognize the 
right of patients to request withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. S. Elizabeth Wilborn 
Malloy, Beyond Misguided Paternalism: Resuscitating The Right To Refuse Medical 
Treatment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1035, 1052–53 (1998). 
  Similarly, in the British Tony Bland case, the parents of an accident victim who 
had lapsed into a persistent vegetative coma sought to have his medical and nutritional 
care stopped in order to facilitate his death. When a public magistrate sought to prevent 
the hospital from withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment, a majority of the five 
Law Lords who heard the case refused to enjoin the hospital from following the parents’ 
wishes. Although the House of Lords preferred not to characterize the proposed with-
drawal of life-support as euthanasia, which they understood to be illegal in English com-
mon law, their decision implicitly recognized a moral and legal distinction between ac-
tive and passive euthanasia. KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 12–15. 
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“Voluntary” euthanasia refers to euthanasia performed upon the ex-
plicit and affirmative request of a patient.29 In contrast, “involuntary 
euthanasia” signifies an act of euthanasia performed without the request 
or consent of the patient.30 The term involuntary euthanasia itself is sub-
ject to confusion. For some, involuntary euthanasia implies situations 
where the patient did not provide consent but possessed the capacity to 
do so.31 As such, involuntary euthanasia is different from “non-
voluntary” euthanasia, which involves patients who lack the legal or 
physical capacity to provide consent.32 Under this approach, non-
voluntary euthanasia is the correct term to describe euthanasia performed 
on adult patients who are mentally incapacitated or infants who therefore 
lack the legal capacity to either provide or withhold consent. Other 
commentators reject this approach and characterize any euthanasia per-
formed without an explicit and affirmative request as involuntary eutha-
nasia.33 Because of the host of conceptual problems raised by the distinc-
tion between involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, this Note will 
avoid the term non-voluntary euthanasia.34 
                                                                                                             
  When the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, in a reply to the 
Tony Bland decision, issued their Report one year later, the Law Lord’s reluctance to 
refer to the withdrawal of care as “passive euthanasia” was only partly remedied. The 
Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics chaired by Lord 
Walton of Detchant, characterized the term “passive euthanasia” as “misleading” and 
adopted the phrase “treatment-limiting decision.”  KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 
23, at 96–100. 
 29. KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 96–100. 
 30. Id. at 9–12. 
 31. See, e.g., Jocelyn Downie, The Contested Lessons of Euthanasia in the Nether-
lands, 8 HEALTH L.J. 119, 133 (2000) (responding to a report that as many as 14,691 
patients were terminated without request in 1990, the author noted, “what [a critic] calls 
involuntary euthanasia is at worst non-voluntary euthanasia and cessation of treatment.”). 
 32. Id. 
 33. E.g., JOHN LADD, ETHICAL ISSUES RELATING TO LIFE AND DEATH 8–9 (John Ladd 
ed., 1979). 
 34. For example, consider the case of an adult, healthy individual who records a writ-
ten request to receive euthanasia should the individual ever enter into a “lengthy” coma. 
One year later, the individual suffers an accident and lapses into a coma. Complying with 
the patient’s earlier written request, the physician provides euthanasia to the comatose 
patient. Has the physician provided involuntary or non-voluntary euthanasia?  Would the 
answer change if the patient had only been in the coma for two hours?  What if the pa-
tient had lain comatose for two years?  While the precise characterization of this and 
comparable examples are certainly open to debate, that debate provides only limited in-
sight into the broader discussion of legalized euthanasia. Consequently, this Note will 
classify all cases where the patient has not made an explicit, affirmative request for 
euthanasia as involuntary euthanasia. 
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Physicians, legislators and social commentators frequently distinguish 
between euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (PAS).35 In the case of 
active voluntary euthanasia, a physician performs the actual step of ad-
ministering the lethal treatment.36 Individuals who request PAS perform 
the actual, volitional act of suicide but require the assistance of a physi-
cian to prescribe a suitable pharmaceutical agent to bring about death and 
to be present during the actual suicide to ensure the correct and effective 
utilization of that agent.37 Although many of the same moral and legal 
issues arise under both PAS and euthanasia,38 this Note will not directly 
address PAS. Moreover, because the Termination of Life Act treats PAS 
and voluntary euthanasia similarly, the legal distinctions between active 
voluntary euthanasia, on the one hand, and passive euthanasia or PAS on 
the other, have been rendered moot.39 
“Palliative care” is the technical term for the medical care given to re-
lieve the pain and symptoms caused by severe illness, but not intended to 
cure the underlying disease or condition itself.40 “Terminal sedation” re-
fers to the administration of high doses of pain relieving medications for 
the primary purpose of alleviating a patient’s suffering, but with reason-
able awareness that death may result.41 
Dutch physicians, as well as the Ministry of Health, Sports, and Wel-
fare, which is responsible for monitoring compliance with the Termina-
tion of Life Act, do not distinguish among passive and active euthanasia. 
                                                                                                             
 35. KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 12–15. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Even with a physician present, patients who attempt PAS frequently experience 
medical complications. An analysis of the 1990 Van der Maas Report and 1995 On-
wuteaka-Philipsen Report indicates that, in 16 percent of PAS cases, patients faced com-
plications with completion, including longer-than-expected time to death, failure to in-
duce coma, and induction of coma followed by awakening of the patient. See, e.g., 
Johanna Groenewoud et al., Clinical Problems with the Performance of Euthanasia and 
Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 551 (2000). 
 38. For example, opponents of euthanasia sometimes assert that efforts to decriminal-
ize PAS represent political palatable tactics to pave the way for decriminalized voluntary 
euthanasia. Wesley J. Smith, Continent Death: Euthanasia in Europe, LIFENEWS.COM, 
http://www.lifenews.com/oped24.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2006). Jeff McMahan, a bio-
ethicist, asserts, “[s]uicide and euthanasia are concepts with blurred edges. It is often 
unclear whether a certain act counts as suicide or whether an act is an instance of eutha-
nasia.”  JEFF MCMAHAN, THE ETHICS OF KILLING: PROBLEMS AT THE MARGINS OF LIFE 
455–56 (2002). 
 39. See Termination of Life Act, chs. 4-A, 4-B. See also EUTHANASIA: THE 
NETHERLANDS’ NEW RULES, supra note 5, at 5. 
 40. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 35. 
 41. In Japan, courts refer to terminal sedation as “indirect” euthanasia, a classification 
not adopted in this Note. Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 130 n.23. 
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The Termination of Life Act defines euthanasia as the “termination of a 
life on request” and regulates both euthanasia and PAS.42 Thus, the 
Dutch have eliminated the legal distinction between “active” and “pas-
sive” euthanasia.43 The official stance of the Dutch government is that all 
cases of euthanasia are, by definition, active and voluntary.44 The Dutch 
government prosaically refers to cases that foreign observers would 
characterize as involuntary euthanasia as “ending of life without explicit 
request.”45 
B. The Dutch Historical Experience 
The Netherlands’ enthusiastic acceptance of euthanasia invariably 
prompts the question, of all of the liberal democracies of Western Europe 
and industrialized nations of the modern world, why has the Netherlands 
taken the bold step of decriminalizing voluntary euthanasia?46 Many 
commentators explain Netherlands’ acceptance of voluntary euthanasia 
as a natural outgrowth of the country’s historical tradition of progressive 
politics and religious tolerance.47 
The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy with a population of over 
16.3 million inhabitants.48 The Dutch won their independence from the 
                                                                                                             
 42. Termination of Life Act, pmbl. 
 43. GOMEZ, supra note 16, at 16. 
 44. See Termination of Life Act, pmbl.; see also EUTHANASIA: THE NETHERLANDS’ 
NEW RULES, supra note 5, at 2 (“The voluntary nature of the patient’s request is crucial: 
euthanasia may only take place at the explicit request of the patient.”). 
 45. E.g., Van der Maas Report, supra note 15. 
 46. As previously noted, in September 2002 Belgium became the second country to 
legalize voluntary active euthanasia. Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 130. 
 47. Netherlands’ religious composition may be relevant for a variety of reasons. The 
historical presence of distinct religious minorities, with sometimes markedly different 
social customs and religious attitudes, appears to have instilled in the Dutch a highly 
deferential attitude towards personal belief systems. HERBERT HENDIN, SEDUCED BY 
DEATH: DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND THE DUTCH CURE 135–36 (1997), citing T.H.C. 
BUELLER, The Historical and Religious Framework for Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 
THE GOOD OF THE PATIENT, THE GOOD OF SOCIETY (R.I. Misbin ed., 1992). Professor A. 
van Dantzig, a retired expert in psychiatry, has asserted that, “[t]he whole of Dutch soci-
ety is based on the cohabitation of people who fundamentally disagree on everything. The 
sometimes very creative solutions . . . have given rise to the word ‘poldermodel,’ which 
expressly means living compromise, or as I have once put it, the fair division of discon-
tent.”  Raphael Cohen-Almagor, “Culture of Death” in the Netherlands: Dutch Perspec-
tives, 17 ISSUES L. & MED. 167, 175 n.17 (2001). On the other hand, Dutch religious tol-
erance should not be overstated. One vocal critique of euthanasia, Dr. G.F. Koerselman, 
reports that he has often been dismissed as a “Catholic fundamentalist,” even though he 
was born Protestant and raised as a devout secularist. Id. at 172. 
 48. CIA WORLD FACTBOOK: THE NETHERLANDS, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publi 
cations/factbook (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). 
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Hapsburg Kings of Spain in the seventeenth century and, in the subse-
quent years, proceeded to develop a robust system of mercantilism and 
broad civic equality.49 The Netherlands was an early center of Calvinist 
activism and, in later centuries, was renowned for its religious tolerance 
of both Jews and Roman Catholics.50 Occupied by the Germans during 
World War II51 and a central member of the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
                                                                                                             
 49. R.R. COLTON & JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD, 126–31 (6th 
ed. 1984). 
 50. HENDIN, supra note 47, at 135–36. 
 51. Until relatively recently, the collective memory of the Nazi occupation shaped 
many civilian attitudes towards euthanasia. In October 1939, German Chancellor Adolph 
Hitler signed an executive order instituting the T4 Euthanasia Program, named after the 
program’s administrative offices at Tiergarten Strasse 4. Unlike the modern conception of 
voluntary euthanasia, which envisions the termination of a sick and suffering patient 
upon the patient’s affirmative request, the Nazi euthanasia program represents an extreme 
manifestation of involuntary euthanasia as official government policy. 
  Administered by the Reich Chancellery under the direction of Philip Bouhler and 
Dr. Karl Brandt, the program targeted German nationals suffering from mental incapac-
ity, insanity, or severe congenital birth defects. Various estimates put the number of pa-
tients killed between 50,000 and 250,000 German civilians, representing both adults and 
children. Physicians performed the medical screenings and selections. Patients selected 
for euthanasia were transferred to one of several state-run hospitals located inside the 
borders of pre-war Germany. Patients were killed either by lethal injection or by suffoca-
tion by carbon monoxide gas, delivered in specially constructed gas chambers designed 
to look like communal showers. Typically, the victims’ relatives were later informed that 
the patients had died of communicable diseases. 
  Although no foreign prisoners and only one thousand German Jews were killed by 
the Nazi euthanasia program, T4 was a crucial testing period in which Nazi physicians 
and bureaucrats developed the techniques later used in the extermination camps in Poland 
and Eastern Europe.  For example, the T4 program perfected the use of gassings to kill 
large numbers of prisoners, while Franz Stabgl, commandant of the Sorbibor and Treb-
linka extermination camps, and Christian Wirth, commander of the Chemlno extermina-
tion camp, both received their operational training as T4 euthanasia technicians. The T4 
program was discontinued in August 1941, shortly before Germany’s invasion of Russia, 
largely due to massive public protests lead by Germany’s Catholic and Protestant reli-
gious communities. In 1942, S.S. Reichsfurher Heimlich Himmler reassigned the entire 
former staff of the T4 program to Operation Reinhard, the Nazi campaign to exterminate 
Polish Jewry. 
  Germany invaded the Netherlands on May 10, 1940 and continued to occupy the 
Netherlands until 1945, by which point over 107,000 Dutch Jews had been deported. 
Approximately 102,000 died in the Auschwitz, Sorbibor, and Bergen-Belsen death 
camps. Many thousands of other Dutch civilians were also deported to concentration 
camps in Nazi-occupied Europe, however, aside from the Jewish population, Dutch de-
portees were not generally targeted for extermination. Although no Dutch nationals died 
in the T4 program, the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands continues to shape opinions 
regarding euthanasia, and in the minds of many elderly Dutch citizens, euthanasia re-
mains synonymous with state-sanctioned murder. See generally SMITH, supra note 13, at 
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ganization,52 Netherlands was later a founding member of the European 
Union.53 More recently, the country has adopted progressive policies in 
its regulation of recreational drug use and prostitution, and remains at the 
forefront in developments of international human rights law.54 
Like many other nations of the European Union, the Dutch are com-
mitted to the principle of universal access to health care and health insur-
ance.55 Health care is financed via a mixture of mandatory employment-
related health insurance and population-wide coverage of long-term 
care.56 Private health care providers deliver the bulk of health care ser-
vices.57 Unsurprisingly, advocates for legalized euthanasia point to the 
availability of universal health and long-term care as evidence that the 
financial pressure of continuing treatment has not improperly influenced 
patients who request euthanasia.58 On the other hand, some physicians 
have noted that the Netherlands currently faces a shortage of nursing 
homes and nursing staff.59 
The Dutch enjoy one of the highest life expectancies and lowest death 
rates of the industrialized world.60 Between 120,000 and 140,000 people 
                                                                                                             
40–43; DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS 119 (1997); 
MILTON MELTZER, NEVER TO FORGET: THE JEWS OF THE HOLOCAUST 131 (1976); 
RICHARD RHODES, MASTERS OF DEATH: THE SS-EINSATZGRUPPEN AND THE INVENTION OF 
THE HOLOCAUST 155–61 (2002); The T4 Euthanasia Program, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/t4.html (last visited Feb. 22, 
2006). 
 52. North Atlantic Treaty, ratified Aug. 24, 1949, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. 
 53. The Member States of the European Union: The Netherlands, http://europa.eu.int/ 
abc/european_countries/eu_members/netherlands/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 
2006). 
 54. See Belian, supra note 9, at 256 (“As harbingers of liberal social change, the 
Dutch hold an almost prophetic role as they work through the tangles of contemporary 
moral and legal debates.”) . 
 55. NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH, INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLICATION SERIES, HEALTH CARE, HEALTH POLICIES AND HEALTH CARE REFORMS IN 
THE NETHERLANDS 5 (2001), available at http://www.minvws.nl/images/Healthcare 
07_tcm11-45335.pdf. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 6. 
 58. E.g., Leonard M. Fleck, Just Caring: Assisted Suicide and Health Care Rationing, 
72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 873, 879 (“[T]he Dutch have in place a scheme of national 
health insurance. Therefore, there are no unsavory financial incentives motivating termi-
nally ill Dutch individuals to opt for ‘voluntary’ euthanasia.”). 
 59. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Non-voluntary and Involuntary Euthanasia in the Neth-
erlands: Dutch Perspectives, 18 ISSUES L. & MED. 239, 253 (2003). 
 60. The current average life expectancy is 76.68 years at birth, while the Dutch suffer 
0.67 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants. In comparison, Americans suffer 8.34 deaths per 1,000 
inhabitants and enjoy an average life expectancy of 77.43 years, while the United King-
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died each year from 2000 to 2003, while 55,000 of those typically ex-
pired from non-acute disease.61 According to official estimates, approxi-
mately 44 percent of all deaths involved end-of-life medical decisions62 
while less than 3 percent of all deaths involve active voluntary euthana-
sia.63 
C. Overview of the Dutch Legal System 
The Netherlands’ legal system is a relatively typical European civil 
code system.64 Unlike the American adversarial system, the Dutch legal 
system is consensual, meaning that public prosecutors, judges, and litiga-
tors work together to arrive at decisions that meet the needs of the entire 
community.65 Public prosecutors play a role in implementing public pol-
icy, and may waive prosecution of any criminal offense on the grounds 
that the criminal offense could be more effectively dealt with using non-
prosecutorial measures, for example, resorting to community involve-
ment.66 Prosecutors are expressly required to refrain from prosecution if 
such prosecution does not serve the public interest, a subjective standard 
that the prosecutor alone has authority to determine.67 Although active 
voluntary euthanasia remained technically illegal until the enactment of 
the Termination of Life Act in 2001, for almost two decades prosecutors 
declined to charge doctors who performed active euthanasia within the 
limits suggested by the Dutch Supreme Court in 1984.68 
As a member state of the European Union, the Netherlands’ national 
laws are subject to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fun-
                                                                                                             
dom suffers 10.19 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants and has an average life expectancy of 
78.27 years. See CIA WORLD FACTBOOK: THE NETHERLANDS, http://www.odci.gov/cia/ 
publications/factbook (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). 
 61. The leading causes of death include cancer, chronic heart failure, and cerebrovas-
cular disease. Sixty-five percent of Dutch cancer related deaths occur at home, while 25 
percent occur in a hospital and less than 1 percent in a hospice. NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE 
FOR HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH, INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATION SERIES HEALTH, 
WELFARE AND SPORT NO. 16, PALLIATIVE CARE FOR TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS IN THE 
NETHERLANDS 4–5 (2003), available at http://www.minvws.nl/images/palliative_eng 
_tcm11-45291.pdf. 
 62. Id. at 29. End-of-life medical decisions include express requests for PAS and 
euthanasia as well as decisions to forego available medical treatment, such as additional 
invasive therapies or life-sustaining nutrition and hydration. 
 63. Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report, supra note 15, tbl. 1. 
 64. Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 130. 
 65. Hendin, supra note 19, at 236. 
 66. JULIA FIONDA, PUBLIC PROSECUTORS AND DISCRETION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
98–99 (1995). 
 67. Belian, supra note 9, at 258–59. 
 68. See generally Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 130. 
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damental Freedoms.69 As such, Dutch courts are bound by the decisions 
of the European Court of Human Rights.70 Significantly, in the same 
month that the Termination of Life Act went into effect, the European 
Court of Human Rights held in Pretty v. United Kingdom that the Con-
vention does not confer upon citizens an affirmative right to euthanasia, 
although apparently the Convention does not preclude the Dutch gov-
ernment from permitting voluntary euthanasia.71 
Before the Termination of Life Act went into effect on April 1, 2002, 
Article 293 of the Dutch criminal code, the het Wetboek van Strafecht, 
prohibited any individual from killing another at the latter’s request. An 
                                                                                                             
 69. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 
1953) [hereinafter Convention on Human Rights]; see also Mendelson & Jost, supra note 
6, at 130. 
 70. Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 130. 
 71. Diane Pretty, a British subject, suffered from motor neurone disease, a degenera-
tive illness. As the disease progressed and she became paralyzed, Mrs. Pretty decided that 
she wanted to commit suicide but lacked the physical capacity to do so. Id. at 68. She 
petitioned the British Director of Public Prosecutions for an exception that would allow 
her husband to escape criminal sanction if he assisted her in committing suicide. Id. at 
68–69. After the prosecutor refused her petition and the House of Lords denied her ap-
peal, Mrs. Pretty sued the British government in the European Court of Human Rights, 
alleging that the British government’s position amounted to violations of Articles 2, 3, 8, 
9 and 14 of the Convention. Id. at 67. 
  Mrs. Pretty alleged that, because the United Kingdom had abolished the felony of 
suicide in 1961, the British law prohibiting a person from assisting in another’s suicide 
constituted discrimination against individuals who, like Mrs. Pretty, were paralyzed and 
could not take their own lives. Id. at 88. Moreover, Article 2 of the Convention, which 
protects the “right to life” and narrowly regulates the permissible deprivation of life by 
state actors, also guaranteed a converse right to die. Id. at 75. Finally, Mrs. Pretty alleged 
that, by failing to provide assistance in her attempt to commit suicide, the United King-
dom was subjecting her to “inhuman or degrading treatment” in violation of the Article 3 
prohibition against the use of torture. Id. at 77. 
  In a widely read and much anticipated decision, the European Court of Human 
Rights in a unanimous decision held against Mrs. Pretty on every count. The court re-
jected the contention that Article 2 contained a “negative aspect.” Id. at 77. In other 
words, the Convention protects individuals’ rights to life from violation by the govern-
ment or individuals, but does not create a right to choose the manner of one’s own death. 
Id. at 81. The court affirmed that Article 3 pertained to the intentional use of state power 
and imposed a obligation on states not to inflict serious harm on persons within their 
jurisdiction. Article 3 does not establish the countervailing responsibility to prevent all 
harm to such persons. Id. Finally, the court declined to recognize Mrs. Pretty’s class of 
persons, namely those who are physically unable to commit suicide, as a class warranting 
protection under the Convention. Id. at 86. In short, the European Court on Human Rights 
held that the Convention did not confer a “right to die” and therefore upheld the authority 
of signatory states to proscribe active euthanasia. See In the case of Pretty v. United 
Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. 423 (2002), reprinted in 18 ISSUES L. & MED. 67, 71 (2002). 
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individual found guilty of such an offense may have been sentenced to 
up to twelve years of imprisonment.72 Article 294 of the code prohibited 
an individual from assisting or inciting another person to commit sui-
cide,73 with a possible sentence of three years of imprisonment.74 
The Dutch criminal justice system recognizes the noodtoestand de-
fense, variously translated as force majeure,75 choice-of-evils,76 or the 
defense of necessity.77 The noodtoestand defense states that an individ-
ual, when faced with two conflicting duties, may violate one law in order 
to avoid violating another law or principle of greater moral signifi-
cance.78 Alternatively, the choice may be characterized as one in which 
the individual chooses the “least unacceptable” option available.79 Thus, 
an innocent bystander, seeing a pedestrian about to be run over by a 
speeding car, may be excused for the crime of battery when the by-
stander pushes the pedestrian out of the way in order to prevent the pe-
destrian’s death.80 Article 40 of the Dutch Penal Code codifies the nood-
toestand principle.81 The Dutch concept of noodtoestand remains signifi-
cant because Dutch courts have come to rely on it, as codified in Article 
                                                                                                             
 72. See SR art. 293 (Neth.), translated in AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL 
CODES, THE DUTCH PENAL CODE 200 (Louise Rayar trans., 1997) [hereinafter AMERICAN 
SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES]. 
 73. See SR art. 294 (Neth.), translated in AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL 
CODES, supra note 72, at 200. Indeed, the criminal prohibition of assistance with or in-
citement to suicide predated the adoption of the Dutch Penal Code in 1886. See also 
Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 130. 
 74. See SR art. 294 (Neth.), translated in AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL 
CODES, supra note 72, at 200. 
 75. E.g., GOMEZ, supra note 16, at 37–38. “Force majeure” is French for “a superior 
force” and in Anglo-American jurisprudence refers to “[a]n event or effect that can be 
neither anticipated nor controlled.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 657 (7th ed. 1999). 
 76. See GOMEZ, supra note 16, at 37–38. 
 77. Some commentators have asserted that the passage of the Termination of Life Act 
merely provided statutory basis for physicians’ previously recognized de facto immunity 
from prosecution. E.g., Nicholson, supra note 12, at 9. 
 78. See KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 84–85. 
 79. GOMEZ, supra note 16, at 37–38. 
 80. See generally Belian, supra note 9, at 261. Unlike English and American legal 
systems, the Dutch do not appear to distinguish among legal excuses, defenses, and ex-
cuses. See generally AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, supra note 72, at 73–
74 (listing statutory provisions which may either decrease or increase liability for other-
wise criminal conduct). 
 81. See SR art. 40 (Neth.), translated in AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, 
supra note 72, at 73. 
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40, as the doctrinal justification for the legality of both active voluntary 
and, as will be seen, active involuntary euthanasia.82 
One last feature of the Dutch legal system concerns the Medical Assis-
tance Act of 1994, which entered into force in 1995.83 The Medical As-
sistance Act codifies the principle of informed consent, the common law 
doctrine that all legally competent adult patients must consent to treat-
ment prior to undergoing medical care.84 As a corollary, the doctrine of 
informed consent states that patients enjoy the right to refuse unwanted 
medical care, including potentially life-saving care.85 Physicians have the 
duty to explain, in lay terms, the nature of a patient’s condition, a de-
scription of any proposed treatment or therapy, the risks associated with 
the proposed treatment, and the availability of any alternative treat-
ments.86 Patient rights law in the Netherlands therefore mirrors the in-
formed consent laws of most other developed nations.87 
III. THE DUTCH APPROACH TO REGULATING EUTHANASIA 
A. Euthanasia Case Law 
Prior to 2002, active euthanasia remained technically illegal under Ar-
ticle 293 of the Dutch Penal Code.88 Public prosecutors and the courts 
therefore turned to the principle of noodtoestand to justify euthanasia and 
excuse physicians from criminal penalties.89 The first case that expressly 
decriminalized euthanasia occurred in the town of Alkmaar in 1984. In 
the Alkmaar case, the Dutch Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a 
                                                                                                             
 82. See Welie, supra note 9, at 42–43; see generally Ubaldus de Vries, A Dutch Per-
spective: The Limits of Lawful Euthanasia, 13 ANN. HEALTH L. 365 (2004). 
 83. Nel Koster, Patient Rights and Patient Education in the Netherlands, UNIV. 
NOTTINGHAM STUDENT HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CENTRE, May 19, 1997, available at 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/law/hrlc/hrnews/may97/koster.htm. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. T. PATRICK HILL & DAVID SHIRLEY, THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE RIGHT TO 
DIE, A GOOD DEATH: TAKING MORE CONTROL AT THE END OF YOUR LIFE 7–8 (Sharon 
Sharp ed., 1992). 
 87. All common law and most civil code systems presume the right of competent 
adults to consent or refuse medical intervention, including life-sustaining treatment, 
unless that presumption is rebutted. Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 130. 
 88. See SR art. 293 (Neth.), translated in AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL 
CODES, supra note 72, at 200. 
 89. The irony of using noodtoestand defense in euthanasia cases has not been lost on 
some foreign commentators. Article 293 was adopted to discourage suicide by imposing 
criminal sanctions on individuals who assist in suicide. In essence, reliance on nood-
toestand allows Dutch courts to use a legal exception in order to nullify a law that was 
created to eliminate the exception. GOMEZ, supra note 16, at 25. 
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physician who had performed euthanasia on a ninety-five year old 
woman whose health was deteriorating.90 The woman suffered from 
moderate but not “acute” pain and was not facing imminent death.91 In 
pronouncing the defendant guilty but imposing no punishment, the dis-
trict court rejected the physician’s attempt to establish a noodtoestand 
defense. The defendant argued that he had attempted in good faith to re-
solve his conflicting duties, namely, to observe the Article 293 prohibi-
tion against killing another individual and his duty to respond to the pa-
tient’s request to alleviate her unbearable suffering.92 The defendant, 
with assistance from the Netherlands Society for Voluntary Euthanasia,93 
appealed to the Dutch Supreme Court, which overturned his conviction 
and ordered the district court to reconsider the noodtoestand defense.94 
Interestingly, the Dutch Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s initial 
theory of the case. The defendant had agued that the ethical conflict in-
volved his duty to obey Article 293, on the one hand, and his profes-
sional responsibility to respect his patient’s right to personal autonomy, 
on the other.95 Disposing of the personal autonomy argument, the court 
noted that the district court had overlooked the physician’s duty to alle-
viate his patient’s suffering according to the prevailing standards of 
medical ethics.96 
The Supreme Court’s line of reasoning significantly influenced the 
conceptual development of euthanasia law. First, the court expressly de-
nied the significance, as a determinative factor in euthanasia cases, of the 
patient’s right to personal autonomy, manifest here as her right to deter-
mine the course of her own medical treatment.97 Secondly, the Alkmaar 
case established the precedent in which Dutch courts would turn to the 
medical profession itself to develop the ethical standards through which 
the courts would legitimize physician conduct.98 The court’s adoption of 
                                                                                                             
 90. This case is variously referred to as the “Schoonheim case,” after the name of the 
physician defendant, or the “Alkmaar case,” after the name of the town where the events 
occurred. E.g., Belian, supra note 9, at 267–68. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 130. 
 93. GOMEZ, supra note 16, at 36. 
 94. Belian, supra note 9, at 268–71. 
 95. GOMEZ, supra note 16, at 36. 
 96. KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 85. The Dutch Supreme Court appears 
to have relied on the beneficent approach to medical ethics, which holds that it is the 
physician’s prerogative, as opposed to the patient’s right, to decide the proper course of 
medical treatment. 
 97. See Downie, supra note 31, at 124. 
 98. Belian, supra note 9, at 270. 
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these two principles would later result in increased legal acceptance of 
involuntary euthanasia. 
Soon after the Alkmaar case was decided, the Royal Dutch Medical 
Association (KNMG) published a set of “due care” guidelines that pur-
ported to define the circumstances in which Dutch physicians could ethi-
cally perform euthanasia.99 The KNMG guidelines stated that, in order 
for a physician to respond to a euthanasia request with due care, the 
euthanasia request must be voluntary, persistent, and well-considered.100 
The patient must suffer from intolerable and incurable pain and a dis-
cernable, terminal illness.101 Thereafter, Dutch courts adopted the 
KNMG guidelines as the legal prerequisites of due care in a series of 
cases between 1985 and 2001.102 
Despite the integration of the KNMG’s due care provisions, courts re-
mained confused regarding what clinical circumstances satisfied the re-
quirements of due care. In 1985, a court acquitted an anesthesiologist 
who provided euthanasia to a woman suffering from multiple sclerosis.103 
The court thereby eliminated the due care requirement that a patient must 
suffer from a terminal illness. By 1986, courts decided that a patient need 
not suffer from physical pain; mental anguish would also satisfy the “in-
tolerable pain” due care requirement.104 Similarly, all reported prosecu-
tions of euthanasia prior to 1993 involved patients who suffered from 
either physical or mental pain.105 Then, in the 1993 Assen case, a district 
court acquitted a physician who had performed active voluntary euthana-
sia on an otherwise healthy, forty-three year old woman.106 The patient 
did not suffer from any diagnosable physical or mental condition, but had 
recently lost both of her sons and had divorced her husband.107 With the 
Assen case, Dutch courts seemed to abandon the requirement that a pa-
                                                                                                             
 99. KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 83. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. HENDIN, supra note 47, at 47–48. 
 103. Downie, supra note 31, at 125. Multiple sclerosis is an inflammatory disease of 
the central nervous system.  Although extremely painful and massively debilitating, mul-
tiple sclerosis is not typically terminal. See TABERS’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 
1156–57 (C.K. Thomas ed., 16th ed. 1989). 
 104. Herbert Hendin, The Slippery Slope: The Dutch Example, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 427, 
428 (1996). 
 105. HENDIN, supra note 47, at 48. 
 106. The 1993 case against Dr. Chabot is frequently referred to as the “Assen case,” 
after the city in which the trial was held. Id. at 47–48. 
 107. Id. 
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tient suffer from intolerable pain or, for that matter, from any discernable 
medical condition as a pre-condition for the noodtoestand defense.108 
By 1999, Dutch euthanasia case law seemed to have weakened the 
“voluntary and well-considered request” requirement as well. Public 
prosecutors declined to bring charges against a physician who acquiesced 
to a request for PAS from a seventy-one year old male patient with vas-
cular dementia.109 Because the patient was suffering from a degenerative 
psycho-organic disorder, the patient’s hospital organized a consultation 
by the hospital’s chief psychiatrist, a committee of independent medical 
professionals, and an external psychiatric consultant.110 After the review 
committee and other consultants concluded that the patient possessed the 
requisite mental competence to make a PAS request, the patient’s doctor 
prescribed a high-dose barbiturate solution.111 However, the patient did 
not actually drink the solution and commit suicide until four months after 
his psychiatric evaluation.112 In those four months, there appears to have 
been no effort to continue to monitor the patient’s mental capacity. 
Through these series of decisions, Dutch courts diluted most of the due 
care requirements first articulated by the KNMG guidelines.113 Indeed, 
foreign critics saw incontrovertible evidence that the Netherlands had 
descended the slippery slope towards completely unfettered euthanasia-
on-demand.114 Other detractors went further, arguing that the Dutch at-
                                                                                                             
 108. Since the Assen court acquitted Dr. Chabot in 1993, the court’s holding that a 
patient need not suffer from a diagnosable medical condition is no longer valid under 
Dutch case law. In 2003, after the Termination of Life Act went into effect, the Dutch 
Supreme Court ruled in the Sutorius case that “being tired of life” was not a sufficient 
reason for assenting to a patient’s request for active euthanasia. In that decision, the court 
upheld the conviction of Dr. Sutorius, who had performed euthanasia on former Dutch 
senator Edward Brongersma. An Amsterdam court had convicted Dr. Sutorius under 
Article 293 of the Dutch Penal Code but had imposed no penalty. Responding to his ap-
peal, the Dutch Supreme Court held that a patient’s suffering must be linked to a recog-
nized physical or mental condition. Tony Sheldon, Being Tired is Not Grounds for 
Euthanasia, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 71 (2003). 
 109. Tony Sheldon, Euthanasia Endorsed in Dutch Patient with Dementia, 319 BRIT. 
MED. J. 75 (1999). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. 
 114. For example, one witness, testifying before the Canadian Senate Committee on 
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, asserted, “Netherlands is no longer on the slippery 
slope; it has turned into Niagara Falls. . . .”   Downie, supra note 31, at 119 n.2; GOMEZ, 
supra note 16, at 38–39. 
  There are three different types of slippery slope arguments that critics of the 
Dutch euthanasia system rely upon. First, some critics argue that legalization increases 
the frequency and volume of cases of voluntary euthanasia. As Jocelyn Downie demon-
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tempt to regulate euthanasia failed to prevent involuntary euthanasia as 
well.115 
The Dutch appeared to have crossed the Rubicon when, in December 
2004, the Groningen Academic Hospital announced new guidelines that 
would permit physicians to perform involuntary euthanasia on severely 
handicapped newborn infants.116 Equally troubling, the hospital revealed 
that it had already performed four such killings in 2004117 and had been 
performing similar procedures since at least 2000.118 The revelation coin-
cided with reports that the KNMG had asked the Ministry of Health, 
Sports, and Welfare to recommend new guidelines that would permit 
involuntary euthanasia for “children, the severely mentally retarded and 
patients in irreversible comas.”119 Predictably, this latest evidence of in-
voluntary euthanasia has engendered a fresh wave of alarm among inter-
national observers.120 
Netherlands’ euthanasia case law suggests three primary findings. 
First, rather than addressing euthanasia as a question of patients’ rights or 
self-determination, Dutch courts frame the euthanasia debate as a ques-
tion of prevailing medical ethics.121 Second, by defining the extent of a 
physician’s duty in terms of “prevailing standards of medical ethics,” and 
by adopting the KNMG’s proposed practice guidelines as binding law, 
Dutch courts institutionalized a broad degree of deference to the opinions 
                                                                                                             
strates, the empirical data provided by three consecutive studies indicates that this argu-
ment is not valid; after an initial increase in the number of voluntary euthanasia cases 
between 1990 and 1995, the number of voluntary euthanasia cases appears to have stabi-
lized from 1995 through 2001. Downie, supra note 31, at 135. 
  The second slippery slope argument, dubbed the comparative international argu-
ment, asserts that the Netherlands’ euthanasia policy has resulted in a relative higher 
incidence of euthanasia in Netherlands compared to other nations. Although Ms. Downie 
asserts that data exists that suggests this argument is false with respect to Australia, there 
is simply insufficient reliable data regarding the incidence of euthanasia in most other 
countries to prove the veracity or falsehood of this argument. Id. at 136. 
  Finally, a third version of the slippery slope is the argument that, by decriminaliz-
ing voluntary active euthanasia, the Dutch approach has inoculated Dutch physicians, the 
courts, and society against the unacceptability of involuntary euthanasia. E.g., KEOWN, 
PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 70. 
 115. HENDIN, supra note 47, at 23. 
 116. Horsnell, supra note 1, at 13. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Casey Research: What We Now Know, Euthanasia: The Netherlands’ Slippery 
Slope, Dec. 14, 2004, http://www.howestreet.com/story.php?ArticleId=815 [hereinafter 
Casey Research]. 
 119. The Dutch Ponder “Mercy Killing” Rules, CNN.COM (Dec. 1, 2004), http://www. 
cnn.com/2004/HEALTH/12/01/netherlands.mercykill/index.html. 
 120. E.g., Casey Research, supra note 118. 
 121. GOMEZ, supra note 16, at 36–37. 
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and social judgments of the medical community.122 Finally, the KNMG 
guidelines, originally intended to safeguard against physician abuse, have 
consistently failed to prevent Dutch physicians from performing euthana-
sia in a widening array of clinical circumstances.123 These findings indi-
cate that the courts have abrogated at least some of their responsibility to 
serve as an independent check on physician conduct. 
B. The 2002 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act 
As previously noted, the Termination of Life Act codifies, with several 
minor but important modifications, substantially all of the due care re-
quirements adopted by Dutch courts since 1984.124 Technically, both ac-
tive voluntary euthanasia and PAS remain criminal offenses under the 
Dutch Penal Code.125 However, the Act grants a statutory exemption for 
a physician who performs active voluntary euthanasia when the physi-
cian satisfies the requirement of due care and subsequently notifies the 
municipal pathologist.126 Significantly, the Act does not address involun-
tary euthanasia or terminal sedation. Presumably, both practices remain 
illegal, but as with active voluntary euthanasia prior to 1984, physicians 
who perform involuntary euthanasia or terminal sedation rarely face se-
rious criminal penalties.127 
The first requirement of due care states that the physician who seeks to 
perform euthanasia must “hold the conviction that the request by the pa-
tient was voluntary and well-considered.”128 The Act thus dispenses with 
the requirement, first suggested in the 1984 KNMG guidelines, that the 
                                                                                                             
 122. See generally Belian, supra note 9. 
 123. As one vocal Dutch critic of the legalization of euthanasia has stated, “[i]f we 
today accept the intentional killing of a patient as a solution for one problem, then tomor-
row we will find a hundred problems for which killing must be accepted as a solution.”  
Gunning, supra note 12. 
 124. See generally Mendelson & Jost, supra note 6, at 130. 
 125. Termination of Life Act, chs. 4-A, 4-B. 
 126. Id. 
 127. For example, Dr. Wilfred van Oijen, an active euthanasia advocate who appeared 
in a 1994 television documentary on euthanasia, was convicted of murder in November 
of 2004. Dr. van Oijen had injected a lethal dose of alcuronium chloride into an eighty-
four year old comatose patient. The patient had made no previous euthanasia request and 
was expected to die within 48 hours. The Dutch Supreme Court held that Dr. van Oijen’s 
conduct failed to satisfy both the due care requirements of the Termination of Life Act 
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Tony Sheldon, Two Test Cases in Netherlands Clarify Law on Murder and Palliative 
Care, 328 BRIT. MED. J. 1206 (2004). 
 128. Termination of Life Act, ch. 2, art. 2(1)(a). 
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patient’s request was “durable” and “persistent.”129 More importantly, the 
earlier KNMG guidelines indicated that the patient’s request must be free 
and voluntary, while the new Termination of Life Act only requires that 
the physician “hold the conviction” that the patient’s request is free and 
voluntary.130 The Act, therefore, appears to adopt a less rigorous standard 
than the KNMG guidelines. 
Similarly, the second requirement of due care states that the physician 
must “hold the conviction that the patient’s suffering was lasting and un-
bearable.”131 Like the “voluntary and well-considered” element, the em-
phasis on the “lasting and unbearable suffering” requirement is not on 
the patient’s actual state of suffering, but rather the physician’s subjec-
tive belief. Moreover, the Termination of Life Act does not define “suf-
fering” as either physical or emotional pain, nor does the Act provide 
objective criteria or clinical indicators that would assist physicians or 
prosecutors in determining whether a patient’s actual suffering fits the 
statutory standard. 
The clinical due care requirement states that the patient must “hold the 
conviction that there was no other reasonable solution for the situation he 
was in.”132 Unlike the “voluntary and well-considered” and “lasting and 
unbearable suffering” requirements, the “no other solution” criteria 
places the emphasis on the patient’s subjective beliefs. Ironically, the 
availability of other medical solutions represents the one due care re-
quirement that physicians, by virtue of their professional training and 
clinical expertise, are better positioned than patients to decide. Once 
again, the Termination of Life Act appears to have misallocated the re-
sponsibilities between the physician and the patient. 
Regarding the Act’s procedural requirements, a physician must, as a 
preliminary step, have informed the patient about the “situation he was in 
and his prospects.”133 This procedural protection represents a reaffirma-
tion of the doctrine of informed consent first codified in the Medical As-
sistance Act of 1994.134 Finally, the Act also requires that the physician 
consult with a colleague prior to performing the requested euthanasia.135 
                                                                                                             
 129. KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 85. The old standard of “durable and 
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sumably dispenses with the requirement that a patient’s desire to undergo euthanasia be 
maintained for any discernable length of time. 
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The Act stipulates that the physician consulted must actually see the pa-
tient and provide a written opinion as to whether the patient meets the 
statutory requirements of due care.136 Once the requirements of due care 
are met and the euthanasia is performed, the physician must notify the 
municipal pathologist and document the patient’s death as termination 
from non-natural causes.137 The pathologist, in turn, is required to per-
form an autopsy to determine how the euthanasia was performed and to 
provide independent documentation of the event.138 Finally, all cases of 
euthanasia must be reported to one of five regional euthanasia review 
committees who are charged with ensuring physician compliance with 
the due care requirements.139 
The due care provisions are striking for what basic procedural protec-
tions appear to be missing. First, it remains unclear what specific infor-
mation or technical details regarding euthanasia the physician must dis-
close to the patient.140 Likewise, the physician is not obligated to obtain 
formal documentation of consent. There is no mandatory waiting period. 
Patients are not required to undergo a psychiatric screening or other men-
tal competency evaluation. The Act does not specify what types of phy-
sicians are permitted to perform euthanasia.141 Finally, the only proce-
dural protections that involve non-physicians, namely, the post-mortem 
evaluation by the pathologist and documentary review by the regional 
review committees, occur after the patient has already died.142 In other 
words, the Termination of Life Act relies solely on physician self-
regulation and after-the-fact review to identify and prevent cases of in-
voluntary euthanasia. 
                                                                                                             
 136. Id. 
 137. NETHERLANDS’ NEW RULES, supra note 5, at 7. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE REGARDING EUTHANASIA 
A. Source of Data and Methodology 
The preceding sections traced the decriminalization of euthanasia by 
Dutch courts, the adoption and subsequent deterioration of the due care 
requirements recommended by the leading Dutch medical society,143 and 
the expansion of the situations and circumstances in which euthanasia 
might be considered accepted medical practice.144 Growing public sup-
port for euthanasia culminated in the passage of the Termination of Life 
Act in 2002.145 When the Dutch Supreme Court first decriminalized 
euthanasia in 1984, however, physicians, patient advocates, and the 
Dutch government all lacked hard data concerning the frequency and 
nature of actual euthanasia practice. 
In response to the public debate and growing body of case law, the 
Dutch government commissioned the first nationwide study of euthana-
sia and PAS in the Netherlands in 1990.146 The resultant Remmelink Re-
port constituted a comprehensive study of end-of-life medical deci-
sion.147 The government commissioned similar studies in 1995 with the 
Van der Maas Report and again in 2001 with the Onwuteaka-Philipsen 
Report.148 These reports provide unparalleled information regarding the 
frequency of euthanasia during the specific years studied and general 
trends regarding euthanasia and end-of-life treatment decisions in a mod-
ern industrialized society.149 
For each study, the researchers conducted a series of interviews with 
approximately 400 general practitioners, specialists, and nursing home 
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 144. Id. 
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physicians.150 The researchers adopted strict procedural safeguards to 
ensure the anonymity of both the physician interview subjects and the 
deceased patients.151 In addition to the interview component of each 
study, researchers analyzed large samples of death certificates provided 
by the Dutch government, representing over 40,000 deaths in each of the 
three studies and encompassing the entire universe of natural and non-
natural deaths.152 
Foreign observers note that the government-ordered studies reflect the 
distinct usages and phrases of the Dutch approach to euthanasia. For ex-
ample, the studies eschew the term involuntary euthanasia in favor of the 
phrase, “ending of life without a patient’s explicit request.”153 Likewise, 
the authors avoid the term “terminal sedation” in favor of “alleviation of 
symptoms with possible life-shortening effect.”154 “Euthanasia” in the 
official reports refers to active voluntary euthanasia, while cases which 
might otherwise be classified as passive voluntary euthanasia are gener-
ally described as “non-treatment decisions.”155  Consequently, foreign 
observers may interpret the empirical data differently than the studies’ 
authors. 
B. Voluntary Euthanasia and PAS 
In 2001, almost two out of every five deaths in the Netherlands were at 
least partly attributable to a medical decision to hasten the patient’s 
death.156 Patients made 9,700 explicit requests for euthanasia.157 Dutch 
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physicians actually performed euthanasia 3,500 times, representing 2.6 
percent of all deaths.158 Compared to previous years, the number of re-
quests for euthanasia increased slightly, from 8,900 requests in 1990 to 
9,700 requests in 1995.159 Thereafter, the number of euthanasia requests 
stabilized.160 Interestingly, PAS is generally unpopular in the Nether-
lands, accounting for only 0.2 percent of all deaths in 2001. Together, the 
official figures for voluntary euthanasia and PAS account for less than 3 
percent of all deaths. 
The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports reports that between 4 per-
cent and 10 percent of all deaths occurred following terminal sedation in 
2002.161 These official figures probably understate the actual incidence of 
terminal sedation, which the authors refer to as “alleviation of symptoms 
with possible life-shortening effect,”162 as the reports indicate that an ad-
ditional 20 percent of all deaths involved alleviation of symptoms with 
the foreseeable potential side effect of shortening the patient’s life.163 
Therefore, assuming that the relative percentage of deaths due to termi-
nal sedation could not have changed dramatically between 2001 and 
2002, the actual number of cases of terminal sedation may account for 
between 24 percent and 30 percent of all deaths each year. 
While the official government report concludes that only 2.6 percent of 
all deaths involve active voluntary euthanasia, that figure probably un-
derstates the actual incidence of euthanasia in the Netherlands. The 
Dutch government has indicated that physician self-reporting of euthana-
sia and other end-of-life treatment decisions has consistently declined 
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between 1990 and 2001.164 Currently, the Ministry of Health, Welfare, 
and Sports estimates that physician self-reporting reflects only half of the 
actual cases of euthanasia.165 Consequently, the actual incidence of active 
voluntary euthanasia could be double the official estimates. 
C. Involuntary Euthanasia 
All three studies explicitly addressed the practice of involuntary eutha-
nasia, obliquely referred to in the official reports as “ending the life of 
patients without explicit request.”166 Involuntary euthanasia occurred in 
approximately 900 cases each year from 1995 through 2001.167 These 
cases represented 0.7 percent of all deaths in 1995 and 0.6 percent in 
2001.168 In general, the official estimates of involuntary euthanasia sug-
gest that the practice is a relatively rare but stable component of Dutch 
medical practice. 
The 1995 Van der Maas Report reported that in about half the involun-
tary euthanasia cases the patient had previously expressed a wish for 
euthanasia in the event that the patient’s suffering became unbearable.169 
Likewise, in slightly less than half of all involuntary euthanasia cases, 
the patient had not discussed euthanasia with the physician nor expressed 
a wish to be relieved of suffering.170 Significantly, in 79 percent of these 
cases, the patient was mentally incompetent.171 The same figures also 
lead to the inescapable conclusion that, in approximately 210 cases each 
year, Dutch physicians intentionally terminated the lives of mentally 
competent patients without consultation or consent. 
The Van der Maas Report further reported that, in about 95 percent of 
cases of termination without explicit consent, the physician discussed the 
decision to terminate the life of the patient with either a colleague or the 
patient’s relatives.172 Relatives were consulted 70 percent of the time, 
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while in at least 5 percent of all involuntary euthanasia cases, the physi-
cian failed to discuss either the patient’s prognosis, the availability of 
alternative therapies or palliative care, or the moral propriety of terminat-
ing the patient’s life.173 Significantly, the study fails to document how 
many, if any, of these physicians faced either professional disciplinary 
sanction or criminal investigation. 
If the rate of physician self-reporting for voluntary euthanasia, which is 
decriminalized, is only 50 percent,174 the physician self-reporting rate for 
involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, which remains illegal under 
the criminal code, may be similar or greater. Presumably, the official 
estimate of 1,000 involuntary euthanasia cases per year may significantly 
understate the actual incidence of involuntary euthanasia. 
In addition, the 1990 Remmelink Report revealed that slightly less than 
5,000 patients were killed by terminal sedation without explicit re-
quest.175 Although described as cases of terminal sedation by the report’s 
authors, some of these deaths probably represent instances of involuntary 
euthanasia.176 Not surprisingly, although subsequent reports provided 
aggregated estimates of the number of cases of terminal sedation, the 
1995 and 2001 reports do not indicate whether informed consent was 
obtained.177 If the actual number of involuntary euthanasia cases in 1990 
was closer to 6,000 deaths instead of 1,000, and the relative frequency of 
involuntary euthanasia remained constant through 2001, then approxi-
mately 5 percent of all deaths in the Netherlands result from physicians 
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performing non-consensual euthanasia on unwilling or unknowing pa-
tients.178 
For several years, Western media sources have provided anecdotal evi-
dence of widespread euthanasia of mentally retarded or physically de-
formed infants.179 The recent admission by the administrators at Gronin-
gen Hospital that they have been performing euthanasia on infants, alleg-
edly with parental consent, lends credence to the earlier reports.180  Fol-
lowing the hospital’s disclosure of the new policy permitting infanticide, 
fresh reports have surfaced that physicians who perform euthanasia on 
infants engage in “secret deals” with public prosecutors to avoid prosecu-
tion.181 Although Dutch physicians claim that approximately fifteen chil-
dren are killed at birth each year,182 other researchers have claimed that 
as many as 8 percent of all infant deaths, corresponding to 80 children 
each year, are due to euthanasia.183 Of the minority of such cases that 
were reported to local prosecutors, none resulted in a criminal convic-
tion.184 
Finally, the authors of the Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report noted that the 
proportion of physicians who had performed an act of involuntary eutha-
nasia decreased between 1990 and 2001.185 Despite that decrease, how-
ever, 13 percent of physician respondents admitted that they could con-
ceivably engage in the termination of a patient without request.186 
D. Other Research Regarding Euthanasia in the Netherlands 
A separate and independent study by the Netherlands Institute for 
Health Services Research (NIVEL) utilized data from a sample of sixty 
general practitioners.187 This trend analysis covered a much broader pe-
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riod, from 1977 through 2001, than the government-sponsored sur-
veys.188 In addition to tracking the overall frequency of euthanasia re-
quests, the trend analysis also traced the reasons that patients made such 
requests.189 As such, the study provides a valuable patient-centered com-
plement to the government-sponsored studies, which focused on physi-
cian attitudes and practices, not patient concerns.190 
Regarding the reasons that patients gave for requesting euthanasia or 
PAS, the NIVEL researchers reported that fear of pain decreased in sig-
nificance from 1979 through 2001, while general deterioration of health 
and physical ability rose in importance in the same period.191 The NIVEL 
researchers deemed the incidence of dyspnoea (e.g., difficulty with 
breathing) and hopelessness statistically insignificant.192 Overall, the 
NIVEL researchers concluded that the Dutch approach to active volun-
tary euthanasia did not increase the risk that individuals would request 
euthanasia before all palliative options were exhausted.193 Significantly, 
the NIVEL Report only analyzed patient requests for euthanasia, and 
therefore did not address questions regarding the frequency or clinical 
context of involuntary euthanasia in the Netherlands. 
E. Analysis of the Government’s Findings 
The government-sponsored studies suffer from one primary conceptual 
shortcoming. As the authors of the Onwuteaka-Philipsen Report concede, 
all three studies were limited to the experiences and attitudes of physi-
cians, not patients.194 As such, the studies do not provide evidence of ei-
ther patient views regarding euthanasia and end-of-life treatment deci-
sions or the quality of end-of-life care. Furthermore, the government 
studies do not address the vitally important issue of what factors influ-
ence an individual patient or doctor to consider euthanasia as a treatment 
option. Therefore, the reports contribute little to the substantive analysis 
of the merits of the due process requirement of the Netherlands’ euthana-
sia regulations. 
One critic of Dutch euthanasia practice, citing the Van der Maas sur-
vey and the Commission Report’s observation that palliative care train-
ing, knowledge, and research in the Netherlands lag behind comparable 
medical knowledge in other European states, asserts that euthanasia is 
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routinely used as an alternative, rather than an infrequent supplement, to 
palliative care.195 Similarly, opponents of euthanasia assert that the le-
galization of euthanasia serves as a disincentive to the Dutch government 
to invest in palliative care education and may increase the risk of patients 
requesting euthanasia because of undue influence or duress.196 
The empirical evidence of euthanasia practice in the Netherlands re-
veals a number of troubling conclusions. First, the government’s narrow 
definition of euthanasia excludes many deaths that could fairly be classi-
fied as passive voluntary euthanasia, active voluntary euthanasia, and 
active involuntary euthanasia.197 Second, the fact that fewer than half of 
all physicians report cases of voluntary euthanasia,198 which has been a 
legal requirement of due care since the late 1990s, indicates that the gov-
ernment should not rely on voluntary physician compliance with the 
statutory due care requirement. Arguably, the self-reporting requirement 
for voluntary euthanasia patients is the least arduous of the due care re-
quirements. Thus, the failure of almost half of all Dutch physicians to 
comply with this basic procedural requirement suggests that large num-
bers of physicians may regularly violate the other requirements of due 
care, such as waiting for a patient’s repeated and persistent request for 
euthanasia or obtaining a physician consultation prior to performing 
euthanasia. Finally, the widespread non-compliance with the reporting 
requirement suggests that the government’s purported objective in pass-
ing the Termination of Life Act, namely, to promote physician compli-
ance with the legal requirements of due care, has not succeeded. 
V. CRITIQUE OF THE DUTCH ATTEMPT TO REGULATE EUTHANASIA 
A. Historical Overview of the Moral Debate 
The Netherlands’ debate regarding the proper approach to euthanasia 
regulation reflects the natural tension between individual mortality, tradi-
tionally an intensely personal subject, and government policy, which is 
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naturally public, open, and impersonal.199 Whether an individual believes 
that euthanasia should be outlawed, legalized, or simply unregulated by 
the state, the debate invariably touches upon profound personal beliefs 
regarding religion, morality, and the sanctity of life.200 Consequently, any 
analysis of the Netherlands’ particular approach to euthanasia requires a 
brief explanation of the moral principles that underlie the public debate. 
Virtually every legal system in history recognized the principle that the 
intentional killing of another individual is usually wrong.201 It is signifi-
cant, however, that the rationale for that principle varies dramatically 
depending upon time and place. The general prohibition against murder 
may be derived from religious tenets,202 utilitarian practicality,203 or other 
philosophical grounds.204 Indeed, humanity’s historical inability to agree 
on a universally valid basis for the prohibition against killing underlies 
modern societies’ failure to agree on an appropriate approach to euthana-
sia.205 
The euthanasia debate also relates to the question of suicide.206 Al-
though different cultures believed that suicide could be justified in spe-
                                                                                                             
 199. GOMEZ, supra note 16, at 4. 
 200. Indeed, once the discussion begins regarding life, death, killing, and suicide, a 
host of ancillary issues begin to cloud the analysis. The advances in medical technology 
of the twentieth century resulted in the ability of physicians to preserve some aspects of 
life, for example, a heart and lower brain functions, almost indefinitely. Conversely, ad-
vances in the field of genetics, prenatal screening, and abortion techniques allow physi-
cians and patients to fertilize human eggs outside of the natural womb, diagnose genetic 
defects, and safely terminate pregnancies. These advances have forced a new generation 
of bioethicists to reexamine fundamental definitions of life, humanity, and death. See 
generally MCMAHAN, supra note 38 (studying a range of moral and philosophical ques-
tions relevant to identity, abortion, euthanasia, and advances in bioethics). 
 201. For example, one of the earliest written collection of laws, the Code of Hammu-
rabi, criminalized murder. Drafted in Babylonia between 1792 and 1750 B.C.E., the Code 
of Hammurabi prohibited, inter alia, private retribution, revenge, and blood feuds. Inter-
estingly, the Code of Hammurabi arguably represents the first legal recognition of the tort 
of medical malpractice, inasmuch as the Code established fines for the negligent per-
formance of surgery. See Code of Hammurabi, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA PREMIUM 
SERVICE, http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?tocId=9039076 (last visited Feb. 22, 
2006). 
 202. E.g., Exodus 20:13 (“You shall not murder.”). 
 203. E.g., PETE SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH: THE COLLAPSE OF OUR 
TRADITIONAL ETHICS 220 (1994). 
 204. See, e.g., MCMAHAN, supra note 38, at 95. 
 205. As one scholar notes, the moral dilemmas associated with killing and euthanasia 
are linked because “[v]oluntary and involuntary euthanasia are both types of planned 
killing.”  Luke Gormally, Walton, Davies, Boyd and the Legalization of Euthanasia, in 
KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 113–15. 
 206. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 77. 
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cific circumstances, the general condemnation of suicide extends back at 
least to the early Greek philosophers.207 The Judeo-Christian proscription 
of suicide resulted in the criminalization of suicide during the Middle 
Ages, and continues to inform most Western societies’ views of, if not 
their responses to, suicide.208 Today, few states consider it a felony to 
commit suicide, however, many states, including the Netherlands, pro-
hibit laypeople from assisting in a suicide.209 
Aside from the general proscriptions of killing and suicide, the historic 
prohibition of euthanasia derives from a precept first articulated by the 
founder of medical ethics, Hippocrates.210 His Hippocratic Oath, first 
articulated in the fourth century B.C.E. and repeated by thousands of 
medical school graduates each year around the globe, includes the in-
junction, “to give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked.”211 Of course, 
the Hippocratic Oath is a professional code of ethics, not a rule of law or 
belief system. Moreover, the Dutch medical community has apparently 
rejected that aspect of the Oath, at least to the extent that the official po-
sition of the KNMG is that euthanasia constitutes a legitimate feature of 
modern medical practice. However, the Hippocratic Oath and the legacy 
of traditional medical ethics continue to inform the international debate 
as well as individual practitioners’ attitudes regarding euthanasia.212 
                                                                                                             
 207. The Vikings, for example, coveted death in violent battle and allegedly preferred 
death by suicide over natural causes. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 78. 
The Greek philosopher Plato argued that suicide was cowardly, but could be acceptable if 
an individual was particularly immoral. Id. at 78–79. See generally THE LAWS OF PLATO 
(Thomas L. Pangle trans., 1988). Plato’s student Aristotle believed that suicide was al-
ways morally wrong. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 78 n.6. See gener-
ally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, (Terence Irwin trans., 1999). Feudal Japan’s 
code of bushido, on the other hand, made seppuku, or ritual suicide, obligatory for the 
samurai class in certain circumstances. Seppuku, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA PREMIUM 
SERVICE, http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article?tocId=937825 (last visited Feb. 22, 
2006). 
 208. See, e.g., MCMAHAN, supra note 38, at 10 (reviewing the approaches of Thomas 
Aquinas and Rene Descarte to the problem of the soul, as those approaches relate to 
Catholic and other Christian teachings regarding death and killing); see also NEW YORK 
STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 81–82 (discussing justifications for euthanasia ar-
ticulated during the late nineteenth century). 
 209. See SR arts. 293–94 (Neth.), translated in AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL 
CODES, supra note 72, at 200. 
 210. SMITH, supra note 13, at 19–20 n.55. 
 211. See TABERS’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 832 (C.K. Thomas ed., 16th ed. 
1989); see also SMITH, supra note 13, at 19–20 n.55. 
 212. RAPHAEL COHEN-ALMAGOR, THE RIGHT TO DIE WITH DIGNITY: AN ARGUMENT IN 
ETHICS, MEDICINE AND LAW 82 (2001). 
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Unsurprisingly, most, but not all, belief systems consider involuntary 
euthanasia to be always morally unacceptable.213 However, an influential 
group of academics and bioethicists argue that involuntary euthanasia 
may not only be morally acceptable but actually a moral imperative.214 
Like belief systems in favor of voluntary euthanasia, belief systems that 
sanction involuntary euthanasia are quite varied. Briefly, some ethicists 
argue that spending healthcare resources on comatose or vegetative pa-
tients, who lack the capacity to either feel pain or desire life, constitutes a 
crime against those individuals who suffer for lack of medical care.215 
Others argue that infants, comatose patients, or adults with severe cogni-
tive defects, including elderly patients with advanced Alzheimer’s dis-
ease, are not “persons” and that it cannot be morally wrong to kill non-
persons.216 Finally, if euthanasia represents an appropriate clinical re-
sponse to the problem of unbearable pain and suffering, then it is morally 
indefensible to deny that clinical response to infants, comatose patients, 
or individuals with severe mental retardation simply because those indi-
viduals cannot request euthanasia for themselves.217 Although perhaps 
shocking or morally repugnant to some, these theories in favor of invol-
untary euthanasia are internally consistent and therefore no less logically 
sound than belief systems that disavow involuntary euthanasia. 
In the end, the relative merits and shortcomings of the various reli-
gious, philosophical, and legal arguments relating to death, suicide, and 
abortion, could easily fill multiple libraries. However, a few generalities 
are common to each argument. First, each religious, philosophical, or 
legal argument constitutes a self-defining belief system that may or may 
                                                                                                             
 213. MCMAHAN, supra note 38, at 464 (“[I]nvoluntary euthanasia, by contrast [to vol-
untary and non-voluntary euthanasia] does involve a violation of the autonomous will of 
the person who is killed or allowed to die, and it is precisely for this reason that it can 
never, in practice if not also in principle, be justified.”). 
 214. The group of academics who support involuntary euthanasia include, among oth-
ers, Princeton University professor Pete Singer, British academic John Harris, and 
Georgetown University professor Tom Beauchamp. SMITH, supra note 13, at 14–17. 
 215. John Harris, Euthanasia and the Value of Human Life, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: 
ETHICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 20 (John Keown ed., 1995) (“The real problem of 
euthanasia is the tragedy of the premature and unwanted deaths of the thousands of peo-
ple in every society who die for want of medical and other resources . . . .”). 
 216. E.g., SINGER, supra note 200. 
 217. Richard Fenigsen, Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 6 ISSUES L. & MED. 229, 235–
37 (1990) (“Hesitation or refusal [of euthanasia to the newborn, mentally retarded, de-
mented or comatose] would raise doubts whether the advocates of euthanasia are as cer-
tain of its benefits as they say.”). The United States Supreme Court expressly rejected this 
equal protection argument in Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808–09 (1997). The Dutch 
Supreme Court has not, to date, considered the equal protection argument with respect to 
the Termination of Life Act. 
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not be compatible with competing belief systems.218 Second, the degree 
to which an individual adheres to a particular belief system, aside from 
environmental or sociological pressures, depends upon an individual’s 
intuition.219 Third, all modern legal systems, as well as the vast majority 
of modern belief systems, recognize that the intentional killing of another 
individual is usually wrong and therefore the practice of euthanasia must 
be justified as an exception to the general rule.220 Finally, each belief sys-
tem answers the questions of why and when euthanasia may or may not 
be morally permissible; they do not answer the question of who gets to 
decide. 
B. Conceptual Approaches to Regulation of Euthanasia 
Generally, there are three primary responses to the moral question of 
euthanasia. These approaches are the prohibitionist view, the patient-
autonomy perspective, and the beneficence principle. Each view consti-
tutes a procedural response to the regulation of euthanasia. As such, 
these approaches are separate and distinct from the moral, religious, or 
philosophical justifications that underlie any individual’s personal be-
liefs. Instead, these conceptual approaches answer the question, who gets 
to decide whether or not to perform euthanasia? 
The prohibitionist view considers all forms of euthanasia to be morally 
unacceptable. Consequently, prohibitionists believe that active euthana-
sia, whether voluntary or involuntary, should never be legal.221 This view 
forecloses any discussion regarding the merits of specific attempts to 
regulate euthanasia, and therefore adds little insight into the discussion 
regarding the Netherlands’ euthanasia law. 
An alternative approach is the patient-autonomy perspective, in which 
the question of euthanasia relates to an individual’s right to self-
determination, namely, the right to determine, to the fullest extent possi-
ble, the circumstances of one’s own death.222 In this view, the propriety 
                                                                                                             
 218. E.g., KEOWN, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 80. 
 219. In other words, at a certain point, an individual’s acceptance that a moral distinc-
tion does or does not exist between active and passive euthanasia, for example, rests on 
what the individual intuitively feels. See Ladd, supra note 33, at 166. Admittedly, this 
formulation is incredibly unsatisfying; however, the formulation explains why the core 
philosophical questions of euthanasia, as well as of life itself, remain unsolved despite 
thousands of years of religious and philosophical discourse. 
 220. E.g., NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 77–78. 
 221. E.g., Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of PAS: Creating a 
Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1996). 
 222. Supporters of euthanasia from the patient’s rights point of view frequently frame 
their arguments in terms of the right to die with dignity. HILL & SHIRLEY, supra note 85, 
at 7–8. 
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of euthanasia is linked to each patient’s individual moral and religious 
beliefs.223 Consequently, the decision to permit euthanasia, although 
guided by societal standards of conduct and the realities of the medical 
situation, must ultimately rest upon the individual patient’s voluntary and 
affirmative choice.224 Significantly, the patient-autonomy perspective 
accommodates the prohibitionist’s beliefs, inasmuch as the patient-
autonomy advocate does not accept the validity of involuntary euthana-
sia. Thus, individuals who believe that euthanasia is morally wrong but 
live in a patient-autonomy system may simply choose not to request 
euthanasia. A legal regime that strongly adopts patient-autonomy princi-
ples may also accommodate the beneficent approach as well. For exam-
ple, a patient that accepts that the doctor, not the patient, should deter-
mine the course of treatment may simply acquiesce to any course of 
treatment, including euthanasia, which the doctor recommends. 
The third general approach to euthanasia, the beneficence principle, 
states that physicians’ primary duty is to cure disease and alleviate suf-
fering.225 In this view, patient self-determination is ancillary, or perhaps 
irrelevant, to the primary goal of alleviating suffering.226 Accordingly, 
the physician, not the patient, acts as the primary decision maker regard-
ing the proper course of medical treatment.227 Several additional princi-
                                                                                                             
 223. E.g., COHEN-ALMAGOR, supra note 209, at 82. 
 224. Patient autonomy may be understood as the manifestation in medical ethics of the 
more general principle of self-determination on which most modern legal systems are 
based. Thus, the patient autonomy perspective not only underlies the common law doc-
trine of informed consent, but also has been adopted by the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Article 2 of the Convention states, “Everyone’s right to life shall be pro-
tected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a 
sentence of a court . . . .”  Convention on Human Rights, art. 2, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221. 
 225. Anthony Fischer, Theological Aspects of Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: 
ETHICAL, CLINICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 321 (John Keown ed., 1995). 
 226. In this respect, a purely beneficent approach to euthanasia regulation is incom-
patible with the patient autonomy perspective. In an overtly beneficent legal regime, once 
a physician decides that euthanasia is the medically appropriate response to a patient’s 
condition, the patient’s consent is irrelevant. A less rigid beneficent regime values patient 
self-determination, however, when faced with a choice between two contradictory 
courses of treatment, the beneficent principle tips the balance in favor of the doctor’s 
professional judgment and the standards of accepted medical practice. In other words, in 
a mixed regime that emphasizes beneficence over patient autonomy, a practitioner may 
take into consideration the patient’s preferences so long as those preferences do not con-
tradict the physician’s considered clinical judgment. 
 227. The beneficence approach to medical ethics is based upon the ethical principles 
first established by Hippocrates and, therefore, traditionally prohibited euthanasia. More 
recently, beneficent principles have been used to rationalize both voluntary and involun-
tary euthanasia. The important feature of the beneficence principle is not whether it per-
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ples spring from the beneficent approach to euthanasia. First, the benefi-
cent approach assumes that physicians always act in the best interests of 
their patients.228 In addition, the pro-euthanasia physician who operates 
in a beneficent regime accepts the proposition that certain lives are not 
worth living and that painless death from euthanasia is more dignified 
than painful death from terminal disease. Since physicians, not patients, 
are viewed as the most qualified actors to evaluate the relative value of 
patients’ lives,229 physicians should be free to perform both voluntary 
euthanasia and involuntary euthanasia in an overtly beneficent regime.230 
 
 
                                                                                                             
mits or precludes euthanasia, but rather that the physician, not the patient, is the most 
appropriate decision maker. Dieter Giesen, Dilemmas at Life’s End: A Comparative Le-
gal Perspective, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL, AND LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES 321 (John Keown ed., 1995). 
 228. The beneficent principle is best summed up by the expression, “the doctor knows 
best.”  One example of how physicians internalize the beneficent approach to medicine is 
the response given by a Dutch euthanasia advocate, Rob Houtepen. Faced with the ques-
tion as to whether the existing due care provisions protect against involuntary euthanasia, 
Dr. Houtepen argued that, although there was a need to improve the notification proce-
dure, if the guidelines are followed, then there is no danger of abuse. Of course, Dr. 
Houtepen’s answer missed the point. It did not occur to the doctor that some physicians 
might simply prefer to ignore the due care requirements. Dr. Cohen-Almagor’s inter-
views occurred in 1999, one year before the Dutch Ministry of Health implemented more 
rigorous euthanasia notification procedures and three years before the passage of the 
Termination of Life Act. See Cohen-Almagor, supra note 47, at 168. 
 229. SMITH, supra note 13, at 10–19. 
 230. For example, the bioethicist Roger Dworkin believes that most legal systems’ 
embrace of patient autonomy principles constitutes more “rhetoric” than “fact.”  Roger 
Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Autonomy Age, 68 IND. L.J. 727, 727–28 
(1993). In a pure patient autonomy regime, patients could auction away internal organs to 
the highest bidder, agree via contract to pay less for healthcare in return for their waiver 
of the right to sue for medical malpractice, and request and receive euthanasia on-
demand. Such bioethicists also believe that, since the death of some people, for example, 
a beloved father of a large family, causes greater grief than the death of other people, for 
example, an anti-social hermit, it is acceptable to measure the value of individual human 
lives in relative terms. SMITH, supra note 13, at 18. It remains unclear whether Dworkin 
accepts involuntary euthanasia or merely argues for a diminished role for blind adherence 
to patient-autonomy principles in euthanasia cases. Pete Singer’s advocacy in favor of 
involuntary euthanasia represents a more extreme articulation of the beneficent approach 
to euthanasia.  See generally SINGER, supra note 194. 
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C. Intersection of Dutch Law and the Conceptual Approaches to Regu-
lating Euthanasia 
Admittedly, few legal systems fully incorporate either the patient-
autonomy perspective or the beneficence principle. Rather, most legal 
systems attempt to strike a balance between patients’ rights to determine 
the course of their own medical care and physicians’ prerogatives to pro-
vide care in accordance with their professional medical judgment. The 
Dutch approach to euthanasia reflects this internal balancing act. For ex-
ample, the Termination of Life Act and an accompanying Ministry of 
Health, Sports, and Welfare publication assert that the Act’s primary 
purpose is to further the goal of protecting patients’ rights and auton-
omy.231 Likewise, the 1994 Medical Assistance Act232 and the country’s 
ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights233 indicate that 
the Dutch government is committed to the principle of patient autonomy. 
However, ample evidence suggests that beneficence, not patient auton-
omy, is the primary motivation behind the Dutch approach to euthanasia 
regulation.234 For example, only one of the five substantive due care pro-
visions in the Act actually corresponds to the patient’s subjective state-
ments and beliefs.235 The remaining due care provisions address what the 
physician’s convictions must be in order to satisfy the requirements of 
due care.236 Other Dutch government statements also suggest that allevia-
                                                                                                             
 231. For example, the Dutch government asserts, “Thanks to the new Act, doctors and 
terminally ill people know exactly what their rights and obligations are. . . . The volun-
tary nature of the patient’s request is crucial: euthanasia may only take place at the ex-
plicit request of the patient.”  NETHERLANDS’ NEW RULES, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
 232. Koster, supra note 83. 
 233. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force 
Sept. 3, 1953); see also supra text accompanying note 224. 
 234. See Gunning, supra note 12 (“Many people think that legalizing euthanasia will 
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 235. “The patient must hold the conviction that there was no other reasonable solution 
for the situation he was in.”  Termination of Life Act, ch. 2, art. 2 (1)(d). 
 236. These due care requirements include the “voluntary and well-considered” request 
requirement, the “lasting and unbearable” suffering requirement, and the consultation 
with another colleague requirement, and the requirement that the physician perform the 
euthanasia according to the prevailing standards of acceptable medical practice. For each 
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tion of patient suffering, not respect for individual patient autonomy, was 
the primary motivator behind the Termination of Life Act.237 
Meanwhile, the Dutch Supreme Court’s construction of the nood-
toestand principle in the Alkmaar decision represents a strong commit-
ment to physician beneficence.238 The supreme court specifically dis-
counted the legal significance of the patient’s right to self-determination 
as the controlling factor in euthanasia cases. That construction indicates 
that, from a doctrinal point of view, physician beneficence is more im-
portant than patient-autonomy principles. Moreover, the overall history 
of the due care provisions, from the original KNMG guidelines through 
the Termination of Life Act requirements, indicates that Dutch courts 
consistently turn to the medical profession to decide what constitutes 
acceptable euthanasia practice. Indeed, current Dutch euthanasia law re-
quires judges to focus the factual inquiry on the physician’s, not the pa-
tient’s convictions. The law then proceeds to evaluate the physician’s 
convictions according to a standard of conduct developed by the medical 
community itself. Thus, the case law since 1984 reveals a marked predi-
lection for the beneficent view, as the alleviation of pain, prevailing stan-
dards of medical care, and physicians’ professional judgments are far 







                                                                                                             
of these due care provisions, the Act focuses on the physician’s convictions, not the pa-
tient’s. Id. ch. 2, art. 2 (1). 
 237. For example, the government asserts that “[m]ost requests for euthanasia come 
from patients who are suffering unbearably with no prospect of improvement and see 
death as the only way out.”  NETHERLANDS’ NEW RULES, supra note 5, at 3. However, as 
the NIVEL study indicated, more patients requested euthanasia because of general quality 
of life concerns than for fear of pain; fear of pain decreased in significance from 1979 
through 2001. Marquet, supra note 178, at 201. 
 238. The Dutch Supreme Court’s articulation of the noodtoestand principle in the Alk-
maar decision was that of the conflict between Article 294 of the Dutch Penal Code, the 
article that prohibits the intentional killing of a patient upon the latter’s request, and the 
physician’s professional medical duty to alleviate suffering. Belian, supra note 9, at 260. 
 239. As the Sutorius case indicates, an individual’s claim of being “tired of life” re-
mains legally insufficient to justify euthanasia. Sheldon, supra note 108. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Dutch approach to euthanasia regulation fails because it relies 
upon a doctrinal justification for permitting active euthanasia that does 
not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. Although 
the Dutch legal system pays lip service to the principle of patient auton-
omy, the determinative factor in all euthanasia cases remains the allevia-
tion of pain according to prevailing medical standards.240 
The courts have shifted the focus of the legal inquiry away from the 
patient’s affirmative and voluntary request for euthanasia and towards 
the physician’s professional medical judgment, a self-defining standard 
that makes the medical community, not the individual patient or the 
Dutch citizenry at large, the ultimate arbiter of euthanasia policy. More-
over, because the majority of the Termination of Life Act’s due care pro-
visions regulate physicians’ beliefs, not the patients’ wishes, the Act in 
reality denigrates patients’ interests rather than protects them. In other 
words, by relying on the legal mechanism of noodtoestand, and the 
Dutch Supreme Court’s formulation of the noodtoestand defense in the 
Aklmaar case,241 the Dutch courts have institutionalized a legal slight of 
hand. 
In the current legal formulation, euthanasia is legally valid because 
“[t]he principle of avoiding suffering thus overrides the principle of 
autonomy.”242 If that is true, then physicians cannot logically deny the 
benefits of euthanasia to mentally challenged, severely disabled, or co-
matose patients who lack the capacity to make a formal request. The 
Dutch medical establishment has already recognized the veracity of that 
statement, as indicated by the KNMG’s recent request to the government 
for additional involuntary euthanasia guidelines.243 Notice, even the re-
cent infanticide protocols announced by Groningen Academic Hospital 
are cloaked in the language of patient autonomy.244 Yet, to the extent that 
these cases of involuntary euthanasia involve patients who were never 
given a chance to formulate or vocalize their own views with regard to 
euthanasia, the Dutch legal system has engaged in a legal fiction.245 Once 
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the courts recognize the validity of euthanasia requests by proxy, they 
will have stripped the concept of informed consent of any meaningful 
potency. 
In addition, Dutch courts have abrogated their responsibility to serve as 
independent and impartial guardians of the interests of patients. The 
courts repeatedly defer to the medical judgment of the medical commu-
nity.246 This deference has been manifest in the Dutch Supreme Court’s 
articulation of the standard of care in the Aklmaar case, the courts’ sub-
sequent adoption of the KNMG due care guidelines after 1985, and the 
codification of those guidelines in the Termination of Life Act. In addi-
tion, the Act itself relies exclusively on physician voluntary compliance 
in order to prevent abuse.247 
As a practical matter, the empirical evidence indicates that the gov-
ernment’s attempt to prevent non-compliance has failed, as less than half 
of all physicians report cases of active voluntary euthanasia,248 which is 
legal, while as many as 5 percent of all Dutch deaths appear to result 
from the non-consensual killing of patients by their physicians.249 De-
spite substantial international criticism of Dutch euthanasia practices, the 
medical community continues to rationalize any criticism of the Dutch 
approach to euthanasia.250 
By doctrinally rejecting the personal-autonomy argument in favor of 
the prevailing medical standard approach, and relying exclusively on 
physician self-regulation to prevent abuse, the courts weaken the only 
ethical barrier to non-consensual killings, namely, the right to informed 
consent. Since the Dutch legal system purports to recognize the doctrine 
of informed consent,251 involuntary euthanasia can never be legally justi-
fied because killing an innocent individual who neither requests nor con-
sents to such killing would necessarily infringe upon that individual’s 
fundamental right to justice.252 
In the end, the balance that the Dutch government has attempted to 
strike between patient-autonomy principles and physician beneficence 
has not succeeded. Their approach to euthanasia regulation does not pro-
tect vulnerable individuals from potential abuse, fails to provide physi-
cians with incentives to comply with the statutory reporting require-
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ments, and as a practical matter, fails to prevent involuntary euthanasia. 
Although the Dutch government speaks the language of patient rights, 
relief from suffering, and death with dignity, it has created a system in 
which physicians, not patients, control the circumstances of death. If 
Dutch society believes that involuntary euthanasia is both morally ac-
ceptable and socially desirable, then the law should be modified to reflect 
that conviction. 
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